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Q

Do you have any children?
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James did.

.;

And who has custody now?
I
What kind of visitation rights di d you have i n

;

September of 1987 with t .he children?

>

*

It was reasonable vi sitation.
Those were the words that are used in > our di vor ce?
Rig1
Thank y o u .

+ ~>

-* *-

*

Had you p r i o r

t o t h e 6 t h of

September

-tines S a n d o v a l , y o u r e x - h u s b a n d ,
Idrei
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1

Where wei '-

I

2

"

2

Did

lames anil t h e c h i l d r e n

II i

living?

I ,l,iIn

discuss visitation for around the 6th of

September?

2

Yes,

23

Q

24
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25

A

I I I

What was Line d i s c u s s i o n t h a t you h a d w i t h y o u r '
' I I' '

" i ( "•! I " 'I *

I called him at his job in Pocatello and asked hi m

1

Q

2

you through the screen door, or could you --

3

A

His face.

4

Q

What happened then as he went back in the house?

5

A

Then I talked to the children and I asked them

6

if they wanted to go for a ride with me, and they said "Yes,"

7

and we ,got into the car and went for a ride.

8

Q

9

drove away with the children?

Was his face towards you or was it his back towards

Did James Sandoval say anything to you as you

10

A

No, he did not.

11

Q

Where did you take the children when you drove

12

away with them?

13

A

14

Provo.

15

Q

And where is that house?

16

A

It's up in Oak Hills, Oakmont Lane.

17

Q

Is that in Utah County?

18

A

Yes, it is.

19

Q

Did James Sandoval follow you up there at that

20

time?

21

A

No, he did not.

22

Q

What did you do after you took the children up to

23

Oakmont Lane?

24

A

25

younger brother was there.

I took them directly up to my mother's house in

I took the children up there, and my mother and my
And the children were filthy,

1

A

Right.

2

Q

Then what happened?

3

A

And they just came running from the truck up the

4

driveway.

5

the children into the front door of the house.

6

Q

And why did you do that?

7

A

Because, well, because I was scared, you know,

8

they were screaming and, you know, they, they looked aggres-

9

sive.

And I ran back into the front door trying to get

10

Q

Could you tell what they were shouting?

11

A

No, I could not.

12

Q

What happened as you ran up to the front door then?

13

A

I went up to the front door, and the kids went

14

into the front door, and I locked it.

15

Q

Where was your mother at this time?

A

She was still out by the car.

16

1

17
18

MS. BARLOW:

May I approach the witness,

your Honor.

19

THE COURT:

Yes, you may.

20

Q

21

State's Exhibit 1 for identification.

22

that is a photograph of?

23

A

Yes.

24

Q

And is this the house that you have been testifying

25

to?

(By Ms. Barlow)

I'll show you what's been marked
Do you recognize what

That's a photograph of my mother's house.

1

A

He is three.

2

Q

And then what happened?

3

A

Robert grabbed my son out of my arm while, and I

4

was trying to hold him, I was holding onto Robert, and he

5

was trying to get out of the front door.

6

it shut, my back was to it.

7

from me and ran down the stairs out through the basement.

8

Q

And then what happened?

9

A

I went up to try and use the phone again.

10

Q

Were you able to get through to the police?

11

A

Yes, this time I was.

12

Q

What did you tell them?

13

A

I just told them the address and that we, you

14

know, that there were three people there.

15

their names.

16

panic.

17

was trying to get some info to her.

18

they come in the house, all I could hear was my mother

19

screaming downstairs,

20

house."

21

Q

Did you hang up then after talking to the police?

22

A

No.

23

through one time and I couldn't get through, I couldn't get

24

the buttons pushed right.

25

to them, I did stay on the phone.

And I kept pushing

Finally, he got my son away

And they wanted

I can't remember my exact words.

I was in a

And I probably sounded really foolish anyway, but I

M

But I was trying, before

Get out of my house, get out of my

I'm trying trying to remember.

I tried to get

And when I did finally get through

1

BY MR. PETRO:

2

Q

3

custody of his three children.

4

A

Yes.

5

Q

At the time this matter happened.

6

prior to taking the children, you had not talked with Jim

7

on the phone about taking them; did you?

8

A

No.

9

Q

And at the time you visited James at his residence

Mrs. Sandoval, you indicated that James had
Is that correct?

And immediately

10

or claimed you visited with him at the residence, you didn't

11

indicate to him you were taking the children at that time

12

either, did you?

13

A

No.

14

Q

You just merely took the children.

15

A

Yes.

16

Q

Okay.

17

directly to your mother's house.

18

A

Yes, I did.

19

Q

Okay.

20

other two defendants showed up at your mother's house you

21

were concerned about your safety.

22

A

Yes.

23

Q

If you were concerned about your safety, why hadn't

24

you contacted the police prior to taking the children and

25

advising them that there might be some kind of dispute?

Is that correct?

And from there you took the children to,
Is that right?

Now, you indicated that when Jim and the

Is that correct?

1

A

I really don't know.

2

Q

You just merely took it upon yourself to go ahead

3

and seized the kids?

4

A

That's not the word I would use, no.

5

Q

But you took them.

6

A

I exercised my visitation rights.

7

Q

Without any kind of notification?

8

A

I was instructed I have permission when I talked

9

to him in Idaho.

Is that correct?

10

Q

And you talked to him when he was in Idaho.

11

A

Right.

12

Q

Is that correct?

13

he was in Utah?

14

A

No.

15

Q

Okay.

16

the fellow seated on the left, entered through the front

17

door of the residence.

18

A

No, I do not.

19

Q

Okay, where did Robert enter?

20

A

Entered down at the basement door.

21

Q

Robert came into the basement?

22

A

Um-hum.

23

Q

Okay.

24

A

He went into the house and up the stairs to the

25

landing where I was at.

You never talked to him while

I wasn't allowed to.
Now, you indicated that Robert, and he's

Is that correct?

(yes)
What did Robert do upon entry into the houses

1

standing directly behind it, you were pushed against this

2

wall.

3

A

Yes.

4

Q

Okay.

5

hit you (Dr do anything to you?

6

A

No, he did not.

7

Q

So he just ran upstairs.

8

A

Yes.

9

Q

Now, where were the three children, do you know?

10

A

They were upstairs.

11

Q

And who else was upstairs?

12

A

My sister.

13

Q

Now, Robert ran upstairs, and you don't know what

14

happened when he was up there with your sister other than

15

what: you have been told.

16

A

17

And when I dialed the phone I saw him, I guess he was search-

18

ing for his glasses.

19

really did not see what was going on.

20

Q

21

you go upstairs?

22

A

Just right behind him.

23

Q

Immediately after him.

24

A

Yes.

25

Q

Okay.

I;3 that right?

How, when Robert entered did he attempt to

Is that correct?

Is that right?

I, when I ran up after, I did see them scuffling.

Okay.

They had been knocked off.

And, I

So how long after Robert went upstairs did

And where were the three children when you

1

A

I didn't, know.

2

Q

Were you dispatched on a report that came from

3

Mr. Sandoval?

4

A

5

generated from him.

6

Q

What was the first call you were dispatched on?

7

A

It was approximately 11:15.

8

locate call.

9

red Honda had abducted three children.

I was dispatched on three calls on the same day,

It was an attempt to

I wasn't dispatched anywhere.

A female in a

10

Q

That's what you were told?

11

A

that's what I was told.

12

give any information as to where or where they were going.

13

So it was just a general attempt to locate.

14

Q

15

were in the car?

16

A

17

who had taken her children from her ex-husband.

18

Q

So you had been given that much information?

19

A

Yes.

20

Q

Did you locate that red Honda?

21

A

No.

22

because the information was never given to us as to where the

23

abuduction took place or where the individual was going.

24

Q

What was the second call?

25

A

I was dispatched a little over an hour later to

But the caller didn't

Did they give you information about who the persons

Mrs. Pamela Sandoval was the person in the car

We didn't even know where to start to look,

1 I 400 South and 604 East, on a keep-the-peace.

Mr. Sandoval

2

had located his children and requested police assistance in

3

getting his children.

4

Q

Did you go to that location?

5

A

I did.

6

Q

What did you find?

7

A

There was nobody at the residence.

8

body around to meet me.

9

Q

What did you do then when you found no one there?

10

A

As I was at the front door, dispatch put out an

11

officers requested to clear, aggravated assault in progress,

12

that three male Mexicans had entered a home, had forcibly

13

taken the children and they were using a shotgun.

14

Q

Did you respond to that call?

15

A

I did.

16

Q

Was that Mrs. Preece f s residence in Oakmont Lane?

17

A

It was.

18

Q

What did you find when you arrived there?

19

A

While enroute, dispatch had also put out that some

20

three suspects had left in a gold and white Chevrolet pickup

21

truck.

22

pickup truck, and I continued alone to that residence.

23

I arrived, Mrs. Preece was standing in the doorway, hanging

24

onto the door jamb for balance.

25

Q

There was no-

The place was deserted.

It was a Code 3 response to the residence.

And Officers Halvorsen and Mason made a stop on that
When

When you say "the doorway," was that the double-

1

out where Pam lives.11

2

we had parked across the street.

3

backed up in there, and we saw Pam and her mother loading the

4

car up.

5

telephone.

6

And I said maybe we better go do this again, call the police

7

and tell them what's happening.

8

Q

And, did he go to the telephone?

9

A

Yes.

10

Q

Now, did Pam and her mother see you as you sat

11

watching them?

12

A

13

at, but they drove right by us and they looked right at us.

14

Q

15

didn't you just merely go up to her residence and stop her

16

there?

17

A

18

until an officer come.

19

Q

20

happened?

21

A

22

Jimmy, I says "Well, what should we do?"

23

cut out with the kids and leave the state, you know how she

24

is."

25

them really, they went one way and we went the other way; and

And when we got up to Pam's house,
And we had seen the car

So I told Jimmy that maybe we better go over to the
And he told me he had already called the officers,

I don't think they could see us from where we were

Why didn't, when you first arrived there, why

Because I thought it would be wiser if we waited

All right.

And then after they drove away what

Well, they drove right by us.

And then I told
I said "She might

And so what we did was we followed, we didn't follow

1

then we stopped at my ex-wife's house who lives kind of in

2

the same neighborhood as Pam.

3

Q

You got some information from her?

4

A

And I asked, and I went and knocked on her door

5

and I asked her --

6

Q

7

you did get some information from her.

8

did you go from there?

9

A

And then we drove up to Pam f s mother's house.

10

Q

And that's the residence that's located on Oakmont

11

Lane?

12

A

Yes.

13

Q

Now, after you arrived what did you see?

14

A

When we pulled up, Pam and Shenay and Shane --

15

Q

Okay.

16

A

Jimmy's and Pam's children.

17

Q

Okay.

18

A

Were coming out the front door, walking down the

19

steps.

20

Q

That's Mrs. Preece?

21

A

Mrs. Preece.

22

the mother was standing there and Jesse was coming out and herj

23

son standing there, too, if I remember right, by the door.

24

Q

By the basement door?

25

A

By the basement door.

Okay.

Don't talk about what you asked her.
Okay.

But

And then where

Who are Shenay and Shane?

The mother was standing by the door.

Car doors were open.

Car --

She was coming,

And they were coming out.

1

had ahold of the little boy, Jesse.

And the grandmother had

2

the little boy by the neck.

3

tug, I just followed her in.

4

basement door into the house.

5

Q

With the little boy?

6

A

With the little boy between us.

7

Q

All right.

8

A

Then I got the little boy away from the grandmother,|

9

And then I did, I mean, I couldn't go out the front door

So she was tugging and I didn't
We went right through the

And then what happened?

10

because he had --

11

Q

Who is "he"?

12

A

Her son,

13

Q

Uh-huh.

14

A

Was blocking the way.

15

boy and went running through the house, and then I went run-

16

ning up to the front door up, while he run up the stairs,

17

tried to go out the front door; and Pam jumped off the top

18

banister and jumped me, grabbed ahold me, ar\d was screaming

19

and stuff and trying to scratch my eyes out, knock my glasses

20

off, was hitting on me.

21

Q

22

boy?

23

A

Oh, he was still in my arms, at the time.

24

Q

And then what happened?

25

A

I was trying to go out the front door, and Pam was

Okay.

So I just grabbed the little

And then what happened with Jesse, the little)

1

faster than that?

2

A

They didn't respond.

3

Q

By the time the officer got there, you had left?

4

A

They had already left.

5

Q

And you went to your ex-wife's house?

6

A

Yes.

7

Q

What made you think that perhaps they had gone to

8

Oakmont Lane?

9

A

Well, what makes me think to Oakmont Lane?

Because

10

the grandmother was in the car when they drove by.

11

else wou!Ld they be going?

12

Q

But you didn't go straight up to Oakmont Lane, --

13

A

No.

14

Q

-- you went to your ex-wife's house?

15

A

I went to my ex-wife's to see if Pam had left the

16

children there.

17

Q

18

might be at Oakmont Lane" instead of this other address in

19

South Provo?

20

A

I didn't call the police, Jimmy did.

21

Q

Did any of you call the police?

22

A

Jimmy.

23

Q

After you left the address at, what is it, 6th

24

South and 4th East, excuse me, 6th East and 4th South, after

25

you left that address, you went to your ex-wife's house;

Where

Did you call the police and say "we think they

1

did you go then?

2

A

I went back up the stairs.

3

Q

Did you go all the way up or just to the level?

4

A

Just to the level.

5

Q

And you were looking for your glasses there?

6

A

Um-hum.

7

Q

And then where did you go?

8

A

Then I went back down the stairs.

9

Q

Where was Mrs. Preece while you were doing this?

10

A

She was just standing there screaming.

11

Q

Where were you when she jumped in the air to land

12

on your glasses?

13

A

14

up the steps.
i

15

Q

She, what, went past you, and back and up the steps?

16

A

She was going up the steps where Pam was on the

17

phone.

18

Q

19

your glasses, how did she do that?

20

A

Just somebody jumping up and

21

Q

Did she jump and land with her feet or with her

22

knees?

23

A

Yes, both feet.

24

Q

Did you see her land on her knees?

25

A

I seen her when she jumped and she landed and she

I was down on the bottom.

I was, just as she went

When you say she jumped in the air and landed on

jump on something.

1

A

Yes.

2

Q

Okay.

3

when she got, when you got into town?

4

A

5

that, she was pretty radical.

6

and right about taking the kids and just, and I got paranoid.

7

I told her, "If I come down, we'll sit down and talk about

8

it."

9

Q

I never denied her child visitations.
And did she indicate she wanted visitation

Well, when she called me and she asked me about

All right.

She was threatening me left

And then when you got into town, into

10

Provo, did you ever hear from her before this incident took

11

place?

12

A

No.

13

Q

Now, the children were taken, and I guess there's

14

no question it's by Pam that they were taken.

15

A

Um-hum.

16

Q

Where were they when they were taken?

17

A

Out, well, in the front of the house.

18

Q

And did you initially know who took the children?

19

A

No, not at, because I was inside the house.

20

Q

Okay.

21

A

When I, while I was making them lunch, I was making

22

them lunch and washing them clothes at the same time. And

23

when I glanced out there, the only thing I seen was this

24

little red car pulling away.

25

to the road and looked down, and here this car is just taking

(affirmative)

Did you have a suspicion who took them?

And I came out, and I ran out

1

off.

And I didn't know what, you know, there's been so many

2

kidnaps, you know, in this country.

3

I'll call the cops, I'll call the police officers.

4

Q

5

did you have any conversation with Pam in the front yard?

6

A

No.

7

Q

And you called and you talked to the police.

8

that correct?

9

A

Officer Peterson.

10

Q

And you indicated the children had been taken?

11

A

Yes.

12

Q

All right.

13

A

Well, he was telling me --

14

Q

Okay, don't talk about what he was telling you.

15

What happened from that point on?

16

A

17

really to do.

18

brother.

19

me.

20

Q

And did he arrive?

21

A

Yes.

22

Q

At your place?

Okay.

So I thought, well,

Did you have, after, before that happened,

We didn't even talk.
Is

What happened from that point on?

Well, I sat down.
I didn't.

I didn't, I didn't know what

So I thought, well, I'll call my

So I called my brother Bob to come up and to help

23 I A

He came.

24

Q

All right.

25

your residence?

Did Patrick Dominquez ever come to

1

Q

2

that wasn't where they were anymore?

3

A

No.

4

Q

Why, when you got up there and saw that Pam didn't

5

want to talk to you and that Mrs. Preece, as you say, was

6

being hysterical, why didn't you just leave it and call the

7

police?

8

A

9

going to take the children.

-- and you didn't bother to call and tell them

Because Pam was always threatening me that she was
I became --

10

Q

She works here in Utah, doesn't she?

11

A

I don't know.

12

Q

She lives here?

13

A

She, she, she comes and goes, yes.

14

Q

Well, has she ever lived elsewhere?

15

A

Yes.

16

Q

With you?

17

A

No.

18

Q

Isn't it true that Detective Maak said "Well, why

19

didn' t you just park your truck in front of their car so

20

they couldn't leave, and go call the police"?

21

that to you, didn't he?

22

A

Um-hum.

23

Q

And you said "Yes, I could have done that"?

24

A

Um-hum.

25

Q

But you didn't do that?

He mentioned

(yes)

(yes)

1

occurred, in that these individuals forced their way in and

2

began immediately to commit assaults upon these individuals.

3

Thank you, your Honor.

4

THE COURT:

5

Where are the other exhibits?

6

would you get those for me?

7

All right, thank you, counsel,
We have some photographs that,

I'll take time and look at this, counsel.

I would

8

think that within a half-an-hour I'll be able to give you a

9

decision.

So at this time we'll be in recess or out that

10

long.

11

we'll let you know.

12
13

When I have gone over it, I'll call you back and

(WHEREUPON, the Court recessed at 2:17 o'clock
p.m. and reconvened at 3:02 o'clock p.m., as follows:

14

THE COURT:

We'll continue with Case

15

No. CR-87-497, the State of Utah, Plaintiff, vs. James

16

Sandoval, and Robert L. Sandoval, and Patrick Dominquez.

17

The record should show that the state is present, represented

18

by counsel, that the defendants are present represented by

19

their counsel.

20
21
22 J

The Court has reviewed the evidence in this matter
and has reviewed the law as I see it applicable to this case.
In this matter the defendants are each charged with

23

two Counts, one being burglary, a second degree felony, in

24

violation of Section 76-6-202, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as

25

amended, in that they, on or about September 6, 1987, in

1

Utah County, Utah, did unlawfully enter or remain in the

2

dwelling of LeAnn Preece, with the intent to commit assault

3

upon LeAnn Preece, David Preece, and Pamela Sandoval.

4

II, assault, a Class B misdemeanor, in violation of 76-5-102,

5

Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, in that they, on or

6

about September 6, 1987, in Utah County, Utah, did knowingly

7

and intentionally assault LeAnn Preece, David Preece, and

8

Pamela Sandoval, by attempting to do bodily injury to LeAnn

9

Preece, David Preece, and Pamela Sandoval, with unlawful

10

force or violence,

11
12

Count

The elements of the charge of burglary in this
matter appear to the Court to be these:

13

1.

That on or about the 6th of September, 1987,

14

at Utah County, Utah, the defendants did unlawfully enter or

15

remain in the dwelling of LeAnn Preece, 3, with the intent

16

to commit an assault upon LeAnn Preece, David Preece, and

17

Pamela Sandoval, or that they did so knowingly and intention-

18

ally.

19
20
21

Burglary is defined in the statute, to which reference is made in the Information, is this:
"A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or

22

remains unlawfully in a building or a portion of a building

23

with an intent to commit an assault on any person.

24

is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed in

25

a dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the second

Burglary

1

degree. n

2

An assault, by statute, 76-5-102, is defined as:

3

"An attempt with unlawful force or violence to do bodily

4

injury to another, or (b) a threat accompanied by a show of

5

immediate force or violence to do bodily injury to another."
M

6

An attempt under the law is described and defined

7

as for the purposes of that part is a person is guilty of

8

an attempt to commit a crime if acting with the kind of

9 J culpability otherwise required for the commission of the

10

offense, he engages in conduct constituting a substantial

11 I step toward the commission of the offense."
12
13

The term "bodily injury" is defined in the statute
as being "bodily injury means physical pain, illness or any

14 J impairment of physical conditions."

And, "a statute deter-

15

mines and rules that a person enters or remains unlawfully in

16

or upon premises when the premises or any portion thereof

17

at the time of the entry or remaining are not open to the

18

public and when the actor is not otherwise licensed or

19

privileged to enter or remain on the premises or such portion

20 I thereof."
21 I

There's another statute that applies, it seems to

22 | the Court, in this circumstance; and that is Section 76-2-202\
23 I "Criminal responsibility for direct commission of offense or
24

for conduct of another.

Every person acting with the mental

25 I state required for the commission of an offense, who directly

1

commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands,

2

encourages or intentionally aids another person to engage

3

in conduct which constitutes an offense, shall be criminally

4

liable as a party for such conduct."

5

The statute further defines the words "intentional-

6

ly, or with intent, or wilfully, or knowingly, or with

7

knowledge, as follows: 11

8

tionally or with intent or wilfully with regard to the nature

9

of his conduct, a person engages in conduct,

This is Section 76-2-103.

"Inten-

intentionally

10

or with intent or wilfully with respect to the nature of his

11

conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his con-

12

scious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause

13

the result."

14

to his conduct or his circumstances surrounding his conduct

15

when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing

16

circumstances, a person acts knowingly or with knowledge with

17

respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his

2.

"Knowingly or with knowledge, with respect

18 J conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result."

19

"A person engages in conduct with criminal negli-

20 J gence or is criminally negligent with respect to circumstances)
21 I surrounding his conduct as a result of his conduct when he
22 I ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk
23 I that circumstances exist or the results will occur."

24
25

Now, how does all of that apply to the case that we
have before us today?

1

It appears to the Court that it has been establish-

2

ed beyond any reasonable doubt: that the incident in this

3

case occurred on the 6th of September 1987; that it did occur

4

in Utah County; that the defendants did unlawfully enter or

5

remain in the dwelling of Mrs. Preece.

6

There is nothing in the record in any way to suggest]

7

that they had any right to be in that buidling, in that

8

dwelling, under the circumstances? even though they may have

9

been interested in retrieving these children.

And I think

10

that's what their intent was, is to retrieve the children.

11

They had no legal right, no business going upon the premises

12

of Mrs. Preece under the circumstances and without her

13

permission.

14

It's obvious, it's on the record, even taking the

15

evidence the most favorable to the position of the defen-

16

dants in any respect, that they did force their way into

17

that building, into that dwelling, over the objection of

18

Mrs. Preece and of Mrs. Sandoval and of David Preece.

19

The question then resolves down to whether or not

20

they had an intent to commit an assault as they entered upon

21

that undertaking.

22

I think the facts are established beyond a reason-

23

able doubt, that these men were intent upon regaining posses-

24

sion, irrespective of what it took and without any assistance,

25

that they were going to do it by self-help.

1

The evidence appears to be clear and unrefuted

2

that Pamela did call James after she got up to her mother's

3

and told him that she had the children, they were there for

4

visitation, and that James said

5

Pamela felt threatened by that circumstance.

6

M

I f m coming to get you11; that

The evidence is certainly clear that Robert went

7

in the basement door of that dwelling, and in a contest with

8

Mrs. Preece over the physical possession of the one minor

9

child, the testimony of Mrs. Sandoval is that after they

10

got into the building that she scuffled with Robert in an

11

attempt to get her son away from Robert, the brother of the

12

father of the child; that Robert hit her, on the head, that

13

he stomped on her foot.

14

The evidence is unrefuted and agreed upon that

15

Robert and Mrs. Preece engaged in a scuffle over the posses-

16

sion of the child, and that that scuffle ensued from the

17

outside into the building, and that Robert pursued the child

18

and Mrs. Preece into the building.

19

there is no doubt, any reasonable doubt, about the fact that

20

Mrs. Preece was pushed and shoved and that she did sustain

21

injury.

And the Court finds that

22

There is no dispute from anyone*s part that there

23

was a considerable amount of scuffling and running about in

24

that place, there was a lot of anger exhibited.

25

evidence, irrespective of whether or not the poker was

And the

1

actually used by James, the evidence is clear that he was

2

in a position standing over Mrs. Preece with the poker in

3

a spear-position and only relinquished that position when

4

David came upon the scene with the gun in his hand and

5

ordered them out or that he would shoot.

6

It appears to the Court, of course intent is a

7

subjective thing, no one can look into one's mind and tell

8

what is there.

9

actions that one undertakes.

The only way we can arrive at that is by the
And it appears clear to the

10

Court that there can be no doubt, no reasonable doubt, that

11

these men had the intent to enter that building, that they

12

had the intent to take whatever steps were necessary, to

13

inflict whatever injury was necessary to gain possession of

14

those children.

15

ability, they had a show of force.

16

against two women and a child.

17

these men, in the view of the Court, were acting intentional-

18

ly, that they were acting knowingly, the consequences of what

19

they were doing; and that evidence of their intent to commit

20

assault is further substantiated by the fact that they did in

21

fact perpetrate and inflict injury upon M r s . Preece and upon

22

Mrs. Sandoval.

23
24

They had the physical force, they had the
There were three men

There isn't any question that

So that the case that the Court has found and the
Court believes that the perpetration of a battery necessarily

25 J implies intent.

While

"intent" may not — " a t t e m p t " may not

imply a battery or a completion of the act, the completion
of the act certainly includes the attempt that the statute
prohibits.
So the Court, consequently, finds beyond a reasonable doubt that these men, and each of them, did have the
intent when they entered that building to perpetrate an
assault upon the occupants thereof.
The Court believes that they are each responsible,
under the circumstances, for the actions of the others, since
it was a concerted effort on their part, they were aiding
and abetting each other when they went into that building,
and that, therefore, under the statute they are all three
charged as principals.
So the Court, consequently, finds each of you men
guilty of the charge contained in Count I of the Information.
With respect to Count II, that being the assault
charge, it appears to the Court that since that is necessarily an included offense with the Count I of burglary,
the Court could not find them guilty of Count I without
finding then that they are guilty of Count II, that being
assault.

I don't believe that the law would permit them to be

punished or charge of convicted of that Count II.
The Court refers in that respect to the case of
State of Utah vs. Bradley, 19 Utah Advance Report 4, which
makes reference to a case of State vs. Hill, 674 Pacific 2d
is?

1I

96, and State vs. Baker, 671 Pacific 2d 152, when it indicates)

2

that those charges then as a matter of law stand in the

3

relationship of greater and lesser offenses, and the defen-

4

dant cannot be convicted or punished for both.

5

So the Court finds in this circumstance and believes!

6

that the finding of guilt on the first Count necessarily

7

includes a violation of at least Count II and, therefore,

8

that they cannot be punished for both Counts and that Count

9

II should, therefore, for that reason be dismissed,

10

Gentlemen, the law provides that you cannot be

11

sentenced sooner than two nor more than 30 days from today,

12

It does permit you to have your case reviewed by Adult

13

Probation & Parole for the purpose of that Department con-

14

ducting an investigation and report to assist the Court in

15

determining what penalty should be imposed in this case.

16

You, of course, after sentence is imposed, whatever

17

that will be, have a right to appeal this decision of the

18

Court.

You may do that within 30 days.

And your counsel

19 J will advise you concerning that.
20

The Court will remain you again after the sentence

21

has been imposed in this matter of your right to appeal the

22

decision of the Court to the Utah Supreme Court.

23
24
25 I referred.

Do you have a request in that regard, Mr. Petro?
MR. PETRO:

We would like to have it
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

1

Plaintiff-Respondent, \E
V

Case No. 880106-CA

4

I

V •

JAMES L. SANDOVAL, ROBERT L.
SANDOVAL, and PATRICK
DOMINQUEZ,

it

Category No. 2

1

Defendants-Appellants, J
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This matter is an appeal of the conviction of
defendants of a second degree felony burglary.

Jurisdiction over

appeals from the district court of a second degree felony
conviction is conferred by Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1987).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether there was sufficient evidence introduced at

trial to support the judge's finding, as trier of fact, that
defendants had the requisite intent to support a conviction for
burglary.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
For purposes of this brief, the State relies on the
following statutory provision.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (1978) (amended 1983):
Culpable mental state required—Strict
liability—Every offense not involving strict
liability shall require a culpable mental
state, and when the definition of the offense
does not specify a culpable mental state,
intent, knowledge, or recklessness shall

suffice to establish criminal responsibility.
An offense shall involve strict liability
only when a statute defining the offense
clearly indicates a legislative purpose to
impose strict liability for the conduct by
use of the phrase "strict liability" or other
terms of similar import.
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-202 (1978)5
Burglary—(1) A person is guilty of burglary
if he enters or remains unlawfully in a
building or any portion of a building with
intent to commit a felony or theft or commit
an assault on any person.
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third
degree unless it was committed in a dwellingf
in which event it is a felony of the second
degree.
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) (1988):
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the
facts without a jury or with an advisory
juryf the court shall find the facts
specially and state separately its
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment
shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in
granting or refusing interlocutory
injunctions the court shall similarly set
forth the findings of fact and conclusions of
law which constitute the grounds of its
action. Requests for findings are not
necessary for purposes of review. Findings
of fact, whether based on oral or documentary
evidence, shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be
given to the opportunity of the trial court
to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
The findings of a master, to the extent that
the court adopts them, shall be considered as
the findings of the court. It will be
sufficient if the findings of fact and
conclusions of law are stated orally and
recorded in open court following the close of
the evidence or appear in an opinion or
memorandum of decision filed by the court. .
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendants were charged with Burglary, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. $ 76-6-202 (1978) and
Assault, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
$ 76-5-102 (1978).

Defendants were tried on April 7, 1988, in

the Fourth Judicial District Court, by the Honorable Cullen Y.
Christensen, sitting without a jury.

The Court convicted

defendants of the Burglary charge and dismissed the Assault
charge as a lesser-included offense under State v. Bradley, 78
Utah Adv. Rep. 2 (filed March 15, 1988).
On May 20, 1988, defendants were sentenced separately
to a term of one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison and a
fine of $750.00 plus $187.50 to the Victim Reparation Fund and to
make restitution in the amount of $944.21.

Execution of their

sentences was suspended and the defendants placed on probation
with certain conditions.
Notice of Appeal was filed for the defendants on June
20, 1988 and a Certificate of Probable Cause for defendants was
signed on June 29, 1988, by Judge Christensen.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Prior to September 6, 1987, defendant James Sandoval
was divorced from Pamela Sandoval and he retained custody of
their three children (R. 86). Defendant James Sandoval was
living with the children in Pocatello, Idaho, and Pamela had
reasonable visitation right under their divorce decree (R. 86).
Prior to September 6, Pamela telephoned defendant James at his
work in Idaho and asked if he was travelling to Provo for the
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Labor Day weekend which included September 6 (R. 86-87).

He told

Pamela that if he came down, she could see the children (R. 87).
She found that he had travelled to Provo that weekend when she
saw his vehicle at his parents' house (R. 87). She tried to
telephone him several times but was unable to speak with him (R.
87-88).
On Sunday, September 6, 1987, Pamela went to the
Sandoval home to exercise her visitation rights (R. 87). Her
children were outside the house when she arrived and she went to
them (R. 88). She saw defendant James at the house and spoke
briefly to him then he went into the house and eventually stood
at the door watching Pamela and the children (R. 88). Pamela
asked the children if they wanted to go for a ride with her and
they got into the car (R. 89). Defendant James said nothing to
them as they left (R. 89). Pamela took the children to her
mother's house in Provo and left them with her younger brother,
David Preece, while she and her mother, Le Ann Preece, went to
Pamela's house for clean clothing for the children (R. 89-90).
While at her mother's house, before leaving to get the
clothing, Pamela received a phone call from the girlfriend who
had driven the car when she picked up the children (R. 102-03).
From that call, Pamela became aware that her ex-husband,
defendant James, was angry so she telephone him (R. 103). She
told him that she was visiting with the children and that they
were fine (R. 104). He then threatened her, saying "Well, I'm
going to get you. . . .

I'm coming to get you, Pam, and you'd

better watch your ass, I'm coming to get you."
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(R. 104.)

He

repeated that several times and Pamela felt threatened by him (R.
104).
Pamela retrieved a small trunk from her house which
contained the children's clothes and toys (R. 90). When Pamela
and her mother returned to the mother's house, the children ran
out of the house toward the car (R. 90). As they did so, the
three defendants pulled up in a pickup, got out and started
running toward the house, yelling (R. 90-91 and 108). Pamela was
frightened and tried to get the children into the house (R. 91).
The house is a split level with a front door half-way
between the levels which opens to an entry way and stairs leading
up or down (Photos, State's Exhibit 1, 6, 7, and 8; R. 91-92).
Also at the front of the house is a newly built gray door next to
the garage and leading into a room on the lower level (Photo,
State's Exhibit 1 and R. 92 and 110). When Pamela ran toward the
house with the children she went into the front door and locked
it (R 91). Her mother was still outside the home, by the
automobile in the driveway (R. 91).
Inside the house Pamela went up the stairs to the
telephone to call the police and heard a commotion downstairs
then saw defendant Robert Sandoval run up the stairs (R. 92).
She was holding her three-year-old son in her arms but defendant
Robert grabbed him away from her and tried to go out the front
door (R. 92-93).

In the course of struggling over the child,

defendant Robert struck Pamela on the head and "stomped" on her
foot (R. 99). Pamela and Robert continued to struggle over the
child, then defendant Robert got the child away and ran

-5-

downstairs to the basement (R. 93). Pamela went back upstairs to
the phone and was able to get through to the police (R. 93). She
could hear her mother downstairs shouting to the defendants to
get out of the house (R. 93).
Pamela was still on the phone when she turned and saw
her mother coming up the stairs with defendants James and Robert
behind her (R. 94). Pamela saw defendant James push her mother
head long into the front door and then lift a fireplace poker as
if to stab Mrs. Preece with it (R. 94). At that point, Pamela's
15-year-old brother, David, pointed an empty gun at defendants
and told them to leave (R. 94). Defendants dropped the fireplace
tools and left the house going back down the stairs and through
the basement door (R. 95).
Mrs. Preece testified that, when defendants first
arrived at her house, they ran toward the house, screaming (R.
108-09).

She had never met defendant Patrick Dominguez before

but knew defendants James and Robert Sandoval (R. 105) and had
previously told the Sandovals to stay away from her property (R.
117-18 and 129-30).
When the defendants ran toward the house as Pamela
pushed the children in the front door and locked it, David, her
brother, closed and locked the gray basement door (R. 109). Mrs.
Preece was startled by the arrival of defendants and still stood
in the driveway, by the car she had just gotten out of (R. 108-09
and 119). She saw defendant Robert try to get in the front door
then he evidently ran to the other door (R. 110 and 121).
Defendant Robert knocked on that basement door and David Preece,
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thinking it was his mother, unlocked it (R. 132). Defendant
Robert shoved the door open, sending David back against the wall
behind the door and hitting David with the door (R. 132). David
saw defendant Robert run up the stairs and ran after him and saw
the struggle between Pamela and defendant Robert (R. 132-33).
Mrs. Preece saw that the basement door was open and ran
to it and tried to close and block it (R. 110). One or both of
the defendants still outside (James and Patrick) kicked the door,
leaving marks and indentations in the new door (R. 110). The
kicking jammed the lock so that Mrs. Preece was unable to secure
the door (R. 110). The two defendants forced their way into the
room and defendant James grabbed Mrs. Preece and knocked her to
the floor (R. Ill and 123-24).

Defendant James then kicked her

and he and defendant Patrick grabbed her as she tried to crawl
away (R. 111). She was screaming at them to leave the house and
struggled toward the door of a downstairs bathroom (R. 111). She
was able to open the door to the bathroom where her doberman was
shut in (R. 111). Defendant James threatened to kill the dog as
the dog came out then it cowered back in the bathroom (R. 111).
At one point, as defendants James and Patrick came in
the basement door, they grabbed fireplace tools including the
stand, which were on the hearth near the door (R. 112).
Defendant James still had the poker in his hand and he and
defendant Patrick were still trying to hold Mrs. Preece as she
made her way to the stairs leading to the upper floor (R. 11214).

They both were hitting her as she approached the stairs (R.

114-15).
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As Mrs. Preece approached the stairs, defendant Robert
came down them holding Pamela's youngest child (R. 115).
Defendant Robert handed the child to defendant Patrick and Mrs.
Preece was able to get away and start up the stairs (R. 115). As
she started up the stairs, defendant James came after her and
pushed her on to the landing and into the doors (R. 115). She
then saw David with the gun at the top of the stairs telling
defendants to get out (R. 115). During this time the hardwood
banister and the steel front door sustained damage which,
inferentially, occurred during the struggle (R. 116-17).
David Preece had seen defendants arrive and locked the
basement door (R. 131-32).

After the door was forced open, David

followed defendant Robert up the stairs and saw him struggle with
Pamela (R. 132-33).

David tried to get the two other children

into another room so that they wouldn't be hurt and then helped
Pamela dial the police (R. 133). He heard screaming and
remembered the competition rifle in his mother's room (R. 133).
He retrieved it and pointed it at defendant James who was holding
a fireplace poker as if to spear Mrs. Preece in the entry way (R.
133).

When David pointed the gun and told defendants to leave,

they did (R. 134).
Two or three days after the occurrence, Pamela took
photographs of the bruises sustained by Mrs. Preece and these
were entered into evidence (R. 95-96 and Photos, State's Exhibit
11).
The defendants testified that they had never forced
their way into the house and that they had never struck or pushed
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Pamela Sandoval or LeAnn Preece (R. 166, 188 and 196)•
Evidently, defendant James had called the police regarding his
children being taken at approximately 11:15 a.m. on September 6,
1987 (R. 139). He did not tell the police where the alleged
abduction occurred or where the car with the children might be
going (R. 139). An hour later in response to a second call by
James, police went to Pamela's home to assist James in getting
his children (R. 139-40).

When the officer arrived the house was

deserted and, as he was at the door, a call went out for officers
to respond to the Preece residence on an assault in progress (R.
14).

Defendant James was unable to explain why he directed

police to his ex-wife's house but never called them again when he
went to the Preece residence (R. 118).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Burglary, in this case, must be proven by showing that
defendants had both the general intent to unlawfully enter Mrs.
Preece's residence and the specific intent to commit an assault.
Such a specific intent need not exist at the time of entry
because the elements of burglary include entering or remaining
with an unlawful purpose.
While unlawful entry alone may not support a burglary
conviction, the trial court correctly inferred defendants'
specific intent from the circumstances surrounding their entry
into the Preece home.

One defendant had threatened Pamela over

the phone and the defendants forced their way into the house in a
tumultuous fashion which obviously could cause injury.

Two of

the defendants, immediately upon entering the house, began to
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kick and strike Mrs* Preece and the other raced upstairs and
fought with Pamela.

From the circumstances, the judge could and

did reasonably infer an intent to assault on the part of
defendants.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE JUDGE'S FINDING, FROM THE FACTS AND
REASONABLE INFERENCES, THAT DEFENDANTS
INTENDED TO COMMIT ASSAULT IS SUPPORTED BY
AMPLE EVIDENCE TO SURVIVE APPELLATE REVIEW.
The Utah Supreme Court has recently established the
appellate standard of review for bench trials in State v. Walker,
743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987).

Since there is no rule of criminal

procedure specifically dealing with that point, the Court cited
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1988) and
established the "clearly erroneous" standard for reviewing a
trial court's finding.

The Court said:

On January 1, 1987f however, new Utah Rule
of Civil Procedure 52(a) took effect,
providing:
In all actions tried upon the facts
without a jury or with an advisory jury, the
court shall find the facts specially and
state separately its conclusions of law
thereon, and judgment shall be entered
pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing
interlocutory injunctions the court shall
similarly set forth the findings of fact and
conclusions of law which constitute the
grounds of its action. Requests for findings
are not necessary for purposes of review.
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the
trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses.
(Emphasis added.)
.10-

The language of Rule 52(a) is similar to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Federal case law has defined the standard of
review in the federal rule and Wright &
Miller summarizes that standard as follows:
[I]t is not accurate to say
that the appellate court takes
that view of the evidence that is
most favorable to the appellee,
that it assumes that all conflicts
in the evidence were resolved in
his favor, and that he must be
given the benefit of all favorable
inferences. All of this is true
in reviewing a jury verdict. It
is not true when it is findings of
the court that are being reviewed.
Instead, the appellate court may
examine all of the evidence in the
record. It will presume that the
trial court relied only on
evidence properly admissible in
making its finding in the absence
of a clear showing to the
contrary. It must give great
weight to the findings made and
the inferences drawn by the trial
judge, but it must reject his
findings if it considers them to
be clearly erroneous.
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure, S 2585 (1971) (citations omitted).
The definition of Hclearly erroneous" in
the federal rule comes from United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395,
68 S. Ct. 525, 543 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948):
A finding is -clearly
erroneousH when although there is
evidence to support it, the
reviewing court on the entire
evidence is left with the
definite and firm conviction that
a mistake has been committed.
Further clarification is offered by Wright &
Millers
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The appellate court . . . does
not consider and weigh the
evidence de novo. The mere fact
that on the same evidence the
appellate court might have reached
a different result does not
justify it in setting the findings
aside* It may regard a finding as
clearly erroneous only if the
finding is without adequate
evidentiary support or induced by
an erroneous view of the law.
Thus, the content of Rule 52(a)'s "clearly
erroneous* standard, imported from the
federal rule, requires that if the findings
(or the trial court's verdict in a criminal
case) are against the clear weight of the
evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise
reaches a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made, the findings (or
verdict) will be set aside.
743 P.2d at 192-93.
For this Court to overturn the trial court's finding of
intent and verdict of guilt in this case, it must find that the
trial court was clearly erroneous in its decision.

This Court

would have to rule that the verdict and finding were against the
clear weight of the evidence.

Such a ruling cannot be made in

this case; the clear weight of the evidence does support the
trial court's finding of intent and its verdict.
The crime of burglary has two intent elements.

The

State must prove first that a defendant intentionally, knowingly
or recklessly entered or remained unlawfully in a building.

See

Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-102 (1978) (amended 1983) for culpable
mental state requirement.

Defendants do not dispute in their

brief that they entered and remained unlawfully at the Preece
residence.

The evidence at trial also supports the finding of

that element.
-^ o_

The specific intent element in this case was that the
defendants entered the Preece residence with the intent to commit
assault.

Defendants' main contention is that their intent in

going in the house was to retrieve the children so the trial
court erred when it found that the defendants had the requisite
specific intent to commit assault.

The intent with which a

person acts is rarely susceptible to direct proof and courts
usually must determine intent based on circumstantial evidence.
As the Utah Supreme Court said in State v. Peterson, 453 P.2d 696
(Utah 1968):
It is true that the State was unable to prove
directly what was in the defendant's mind
relative to doing harm to the victim; and
that he in fact denied having any such
intent. However, his version does not
establish the fact, nor does it ever
necessarily raise sufficient doubt to vitiate
the conviction. If it were so, it would lie
within the power of a defendant to defeat
practically any conviction which depended
upon his state of mind. As against what he
says, it is the jury's privilege to weigh and
consider all of the other facts and
circumstances shown in evidence in
determining what they will believe. This
includes not only what was said and what was
done, but also the conduct shown, which in
this instance they may well have regarded as
speaking louder than the defendant's later
defensive claims as to what his intentions
were. This is in accord with the elementary
rule that a person is presumed to intend the
natural and probable consequences of his
acts.
453 P.2d at 697.
The fact that defendants claim that they never struck
anyone nor forced their way in nor intended to hurt anyone does
not make the trial court's finding of intent "clearly erroneous."
The court was able to judge the credibility of the witnesses and
-13-

determine that the testimony of the State's witness was more
consistent and credible.

A reading of the testimony of

defendants displays inconsistencies between the stories told by
each defendant and inconsistencies within each defendant's
testimony.
The Utah courts have consistently held that a requisite
specific intent to support a burglary conviction may be inferred
form the circumstances surrounding the entry.

The Utah Supreme

Court said in State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878 (Utah 1981):
Since the intent to commit a theft is a
state of mind, which is rarely susceptible of
direct proof, it can be inferred from conduct
and attendant circumstances in the light of
human behavior and experience.
631 P.2d at 881.
More recently, in State v. Porterf 705 P.2d 1174 (Utah
1985), the Utah Supreme Court upheld a conviction in which the
trial court had informed the jury that they could infer intent
from all of the defendants' conduct at the scene on the date of
the offense.

The trial court had:

clarified a point of law regarding how the
jury may infer an actor's intent.
We have defined an -inference" as:
a logical and reasonable conclusion
of the existence of a fact in the
case, not presented by direct
evidence as to the existence of the
fact itself, but inferred from the
establishment of other facts from
which, by the process of logic and
reason, based upon common
experience, the existence of the
assumed fact may be concluded by the
trier of the fact.
Wyatt v. Bauqhman, 121 Utah 98, 109, 239 P.2d
193, 198-99 (1951). An inference goes to the
-i A -

trier of fact to be weighed along with the
contravening evidence because such inference,
like all inferences capable of being drawn
from evidence intrinsically containing the
seeds from which logical deductions may be
made, rests on basic facts which remain in
the case. Id. at 110, 239 P.2d at 198-99
[3] Burglarious intent "is a mental state
of the actor. [T]he trier of fact must
resort to reasonable inferences based upon
[an] examination of the surrounding
circumstances to reasonably infer its
existence." Farno v. State, 159 Ind.App.
627, 629, 308 N.E.2d 724, 725 (1974); see
State v. Sisneros, Utah, 631 P.2d 856 (1981);
State v. Hopkins, 11 Utah 2d 363, 359 P.2d
486 (1961); see also State v. Brooks, Utah,
631 P.2d 878 (1981); State v. Tellay, 7 Utah
2d 308, 324 P.2d 490 (1958). Intent with
which an entry is made is rarely susceptible
of direct proof. It is usually inferred from
circumstantial evidence: the manner of
entry, the time of day, the character and
contents of the building, the person's
actions after entry, the totality of the
surrounding circumstances, and the intruder's
explanation. See 12A C.J.S., Burglary §§ 85
and 104; 13 Am.Jur.2d, Burglary S 52.
705 P.2d at 1177.

See also State v. Sisneros, 631 P.2d 856, 859

(Utah 1981); State v. Wilson, 701 P.2d 1058, 1060 (Utah 1985),
and State v. Pitts, 728 P.2d 113, 116-17 (Utah 1986).
In the present case, the trial court did infer the
defendants' specific intent from their conduct.

He found that

defendants had forced their way into the Preece residence (R.
230); that defendant James Sandoval had threatened Pamela over
the phone before arriving at the house (R. 231); that there was a
scuffle between defendant Robert Sandoval and Mrs. Preece and
that she was pushed and shoved and was injured (R. 231); that
there was a lot of scuffing and anger and running about the house
(R. 231); that defendant James had threatened Mrs. Preece with
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the fireplace poker (R. 232); and that the defendants has indeed
inflicted injury on Mrs. Preece and Mrs. Sandoval (R. 232). (A
copy of the trial court's findings as given in the transcript is
attached in the Addendum.)

These circumstances were well

supported by both the State's and the defendants' evidence.

The

evidence also showed that the defendants had approached the house
and its occupants in a tumultuous manner and forced their way in,
knocking people away with the force of their entry.

The trial

court's inference of defendants' intent from this conduct is
supported by the clear weight of the evidence and should not be
disturbed.
In their brief, defendants argued that their intent in
entering the house was to retrieve the children so they couldn't
have intended to assault anyone.

They then argue that the court

must have confused general with specific intent when it found
that defendants intended to do whatever necessary to retrieve the
children.

Defendants misunderstand the court's finding.
The court's decision that defendants intended "to take

whatever steps were necessary, to inflict whatever injury was
necessary to gain possession of those children " (R. 232) is not
a finding solely of general intent.

The court found that

defendants intended to enter or remain unlawfully in the Preece
residence (R. 230) then found that they intended whatever was
necessary to accomplish their purposes.

The manner of their

entry and the injuries inflicted inside support the court's
inference that defendants intended to assault, if necessary, to
accomplish their ends.
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Defendants also maintain that the specific intent to
commit assault must exist at the time of entry.

They cite State

v. Evans, 74 Utah 389, 279 P. 950 (1929) in support of that
theory.

In 1929, the law read that, in order to commit a

burglary, defendant must enter a building with the intent to
commit a larceny.

That is no longer the full law in Utah.

Since

1973, the law is that a burglary is committed when a person
-enters or remains unlawfully in a building" and with the intent
to commit a felony or theft or assault.

A reading of the second

case cited by defendants for their proposition confirms that the
intent to commit a theft need not be formed at the time of entry
into the building.

In State v. Pitts, 728 P.2d 113 (Utah 1986),

the conviction for burglary was upheld.

Defendant had lawfully

entered a convenience store but, when he left the store,
possessed a bank envelope which had been in a back office which
was closed to the public.

A day later he was stopped in a car

which he had borrowed and not returned.

The bank envelope and

checks from the convenience store were found in his possession
and other missing store checks were later rejected as forged by
the bank.

The Supreme Court said that there was sufficient

evidence to affirm that defendant's burglary conviction.

They

held that "[e]ven an innocent entry into the office would not
acquit defendant if he remained therein with the unlawful purpose
of stealing the checks.H

728 P.2d at 116.

The Court also said

that unlawful entry into a private area alone may not support a
finding of intent but, coupled with evidence of other surrounding
circumstances, specific intent was properly inferred.
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In the present case, the trial court correctly inferred
from all of the surrounding circumstances that defendants entered
or remained unlawfully in the Preece residence with the intent to
commit assault.

Before they entered, doors were locked against

them but they forced their way in. After they entered, they were
told to leave but they remained and assaulted the two women in
the house.

After they got one child they stayed solely to

assault the women, from all appearances.

Defendants appear to

argue at the end of their brief that the assaults occurring after
the defendants' entry could not support a finding of entry with
intent to assault.

They appear to argue that an assault must

occur simultaneously with the entry in order to show intent but
that notion is not supported by the statute nor case law.

The

State must only show that defendants intended to commit assault,
not that an assault occurred.

The fact that in this case actual

physical striking occurred is merely another circumstance that
affirms the trial court's inference that defendants had the
requisite specific intent.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, and on oral arguments, if any,
the State requests that this Court affirm the trial court's
verdict.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

/^

day of November,

1988.
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ADDENDUM

It appears to the Court that it has been established beyond any reasonable doubt: that the incident in this
case occurred on the 6th of September 1987; that it did occur
in Utah County; that the defendants did unlawfully enter or
remain in the dwelling of Mrs. Preece.
There is nothing in the record in any way to suggest]
that they had any right to be in that buidling, in that
dwelling, under the circumstances; even though they may have
been interested in retrieving these children.

And I think

that's what their intent was, is to retrieve the children.
They had no legal right, no business going upon the premises
of Mrs. Preece under the circumstances and without her
permission.
It's obvious, it's on the record, even taking the
evidence the most favorable to the position of the defendants in any respect, that they did force their way into
that building, into that dwelling, over the objection of
Mrs. Preece and of Mrs. Sandoval and of David Preece.
The question then resolves down to whether or not
they had an intent to commit an assault as they entered upon
that undertaking.
I think the facts are established beyond a reasonable doubt, that these men were intent upon regaining possession, irrespective of what it took and without any assistance,!
that they were going to do it by self-help.
i AQ

1

The evidence appears to be clear and unrefuted

2

that Pamela did call James after she got up to her mother's

3

and told him that she had the children, they were there for

4

visitation, and that James said "I'm coming to get you M ; that

5

Pamela felt threatened by that circumstance.

6

The evidence is certainly clear that Robert went

7

in the basement door of that dwelling, and in a contest with

8

Mrs. Preece over the physical possession of the one minor

9

child, the testimony of Mrs. Sandoval is that after they

10

got into the building that she scuffled with Robert in an

11

attempt to get her son away from Robert, the brother of the

12

father of the child; that Robert hit her, on the head, that

13

he stomped on her foot.

14

The evidence is unrefuted and agreed upon that

15

Robert and Mrs. Preece engaged in a scuffle over the posses-

16

sion of the child, and that that scuffle ensued from the

17

outside into the building, and that Robert pursued the child

18

and Mrs. Preece into the building.

19

there is no doubt, any reasonable doubt, about the fact that

20

Mrs. Preece was pushed and shoved and that she did sustain

21

injury.

And the Court finds that

22

There is no dispute from anyone's part that there

23

was a considerable amount of scuffling and running about in

24

that place, there was a lot of anger exhibited.

25

evidence, irrespective of whether or not the poker was

And the
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actually used by James, the evidence is clear that he was
in a position standing over Mrs. Preece with the poker in
a spear-position and only relinquished that position when
David came upon the scene with the gun in his hand and
ordered them out or that he would shoot.
It appears to the Court, of course intent is a
subjective thing, no one can look into one's mind and tell
what is there.

The only way we can arrive at that is by the

actions that one undertakes.

And it appears clear to the

Court that there can be no doubt, no reasonable doubt, that
these men had the intent to enter that building, that they
had the intent to take whatever steps were necessary, to
inflict whatever injury was necessary to gain possession of
those children.

They had the physical force, they had the

ability, they had a show of force.
against two women and a child.

There were three men

There isn't any question that

these men, in the view of the Court, were acting intentionally, that they were acting knowingly, the consequences of what
they were doing; and that evidence of their intent to commit
assault is further substantiated by the fact that they did in
fact perpetrate and inflict injury upon Mrs. Preece and upon
Mrs. Sandoval.
So that the case that the Court has found and the
Court believes that the perpetration of a battery necessarily
implies intent.

While

"intent" may not--MattemptM may not
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1

imply a battery or a completion of the act, the completion

2

of the act certainly includes the attempt that the statute

3

prohibits.

4

So the Court, consequently, finds beyond a reason-

5

able doubt that these men, and eachof them, did have the

6

intent when they entered that building to perpetrate an

7

assault upon the occupants thereof.

8
9

The Court believes that they are each responsible,
under the circumstances, for the actions of the others, since

10

it was a concerted effort on their part, they were aiding

11

and abetting each other when they went into that building,

12

and that, therefore, under the statute they are all three

13

charged as principals.

14
15

So the Court, consequently, finds each of you men
guilty of the charge contained in Count I of the Information.

16

With respect to Count II, that being the assault

17

charge, it appears to the Court that since that is neces-

18

sarily an included offense with the Count I of burglary,

19

the Court could not find them guilty of Count I without

20

finding then that they are guilty of Count II, that being

21

assault.

22

punished or charge of convicted of that Count II.

23

I don't believe that the law would permit them to be

The Court refers in that respect to the case of

24

State of Utah vs. Bradley, 19 Utah Advance Report 4, which

25

makes reference to a case of State vs. Hill, 674 Pacific 2d
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